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Abstract
Electing a single committee of a small size is a classical and well-understood voting situation. Being
interested in a sequence of committees, we introduce and study two time-dependent multistage
models based on simple Plurality voting. Therein, we are given a sequence of voting profiles (stages)
over the same set of agents and candidates, and our task is to find a small committee for each
stage of high score. In the conservative model we additionally require that any two consecutive
committees have a small symmetric difference. Analogously, in the revolutionary model we require
large symmetric differences. We prove both models to be NP-hard even for a constant number
of agents, and, based on this, initiate a parameterized complexity analysis for the most natural
parameters and combinations thereof. Among other results, we prove both models to be in XP yet
W[1]-hard regarding the number of stages, and that being revolutionary seems to be “easier” than
being conservative: If the (upper- resp. lower-) bound on the size of symmetric differences is constant,
the conservative model remains NP-hard while the revolutionary model becomes polynomial-time
solvable.
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1 Introduction
Voting is a central mechanism of collective decision making. Among various voting rules,
Single Non-Transferable Vote (sometimes referred to as 1-Approval or Plurality) is a very
natural and one of the simplest committee election concepts: Every agent approves exactly
one candidate, and we seek a committee of a given size whose members collect the highest
number of approvals. This problem is greedily solvable in linear time.
However, typical committee election scenarios concentrate solely on electing a committee
in a single election to the neglect of a time dimension. This neglect results in serious
limitations of the model. One cannot request that in successive time steps the chosen
committees differ by at least some fraction which, in the long run, might cause an unwanted
stagnation or candidate fatigue (e.g., for this reason companies tend to implement so-called
board succession planning policies). Neither is it possible to ensure that at least a certain
number of candidates in the consecutive committees overlaps, which can quickly lead to a
lack of knowledge transfer jeopardizing effectiveness of the committees (which is why, for
example, only a half of organization committees of various venues is exchanged between
succeeding editions). Although some of these issues can be resolved in an online setting,
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2 Multistage Committee Election
in many situations one needs to plan in advance and, hence, needs an offline solution on
which we focus on. We tackle these issues by introducing a multistage [15] variant of the
problem. In this variant, a sequence of voting profiles is given, and we seek a sequence of
small committees, each collecting a reasonable number of approvals, such that the difference
between consecutive committees is either lower- or upper-bounded.
Π Multistage Plurality Voting (ΠMPV)
Input: A set of agents A = {a1, . . . , an}, a set of candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm}, a se-
quence U = (u1, . . . , uτ ) of τ voting profiles with ut : A→ C ∪ {∅}, t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, and
three integers k ∈ N, ` ∈ N0, and x ∈ N.
Question: Is there a sequence (C1, . . . , Cτ ) of committees Ct ⊆ C such that for all t ∈
{1, . . . , τ} it holds true that |Ct| ≤ k and scoret(Ct) := |u−1t (Ct)| ≥ x, and for all t ∈
{1, . . . , τ − 1} it holds true that
|Ct4Ct+1| ≤ ` (Π ≡ Conservative);
|Ct4Ct+1| ≥ ` (Π ≡ Revolutionary).
Our goal is to settle the classical and parameterized computational complexity of Conser-
vative Multistage Plurality Voting (CMPV) and Revolutionary Multistage
Plurality Voting (RMPV). We aim not only to find tractable cases but also to understand
whether the two problem variants differ, and if so, then how and why.
Related work. Our model follows the recently proposed multistage model [7, 15], that led
to several multistage problems [2, 3, 10, 11] next to ours. Graph problems considered in the
multistage model often study classic problems on temporal graphs (a sequence of graphs
over the same vertex set). While all the multistage problems known from literature cover
the variant we call “conservative,” our revolutionary variant forms a novel submodel herein.
Although, to the best of our knowledge our model is novel, another aspects of selecting
multiple (sub)committees have also been studied in (computational) social choice theory.
The closest related to ours is a recent work of Bredereck et al. [4], who augment classic
multiwinner elections with a time dimension. Accordingly, they consider selecting a sequence
of committees. However, the major differences with our work are, first, that they do not
allow agents (voters) to change their ballots over time and, second, that there are no
explicit constraints on the differences between two successive committees. Freeman et al. [13]
and Parkes and Procaccia [16] allow this but they consider an online scenario (in contrary to
our problem that is offline). Finally, Aziz and Lee [1] study a so-called subcommittee voting,
where a final committee is a collection of several subcommittees. Their model, however, does
not take into account time and requires that all subcommittees are mutually disjoint.
Our Contributions. We present the first work in the multistage model that compares the
two cases that we call conservative and revolutionary. We prove CMPV and RMPV to be
NP-complete, even for two agents. We present a full parameterized complexity analysis of
the two problems (see Figure 1 for an overview of our results). CMPV and RMPV are
almost indistinguishable regarding their parameterized complexity, but when parameterized
by `, CMPV is NP-hard and RMPV is contained in XP. Moreover, both problems are
contained in XP and W[1]-hard regarding the parameter number τ of stages; Note that
for many multistage problems (and even temporal graph problems), such a classification is
unknown—τ usually leads to para-NP-hardness. Our results further indicate that efficient
data reductions to a polynomial-size kernel require a combination with τ : While combining
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Figure 1 Overview of our results. PK, noPK, p-NP-h, and W[1]-h respectively abbreviate
“polynomial kernel,” “no polynomial kernel unless NP ⊆ coNP / poly,” para-NP-hard, and W[1]-hard.
An arrow from one parameter p to another parameter p′ indicates that p can be upper bounded by
some function in p′ (e.g., ` ≤ 2k, k ≤ m, or x ≤ n). On below right, a spiderweb diagram depicts
our results ( conservative revolutionary).
the number of agents with the number of candidates allows for no polynomial-size kernel
(unless NP ⊆ coNP / poly), combining any of the two with τ yields kernels of polynomial
size.
Preliminaries. We denote by N and N0 the natural numbers excluding and including zero,
respectively. For a function f : A→ B, let f−1(B′) = {a ∈ A | f(a) ∈ B′} for every B′ ⊆ B.
We use basic notation from graph theory [6] and parameterized algorithmics [5].
2 Hardness even for few agents
We first settle the classical computational complexity of both CMPV and RMPV. We prove
that both problems are NP-complete, even for two agents (and hence for x ≤ 2).
I Theorem 2.1. CMPV with ` = 0 and RMPV with ` = 2k are NP-complete even for two
agents.
We prove each statement of Theorem 2.1 separately, beginning with the computational
intractability of CMPV in a special case.
I Proposition 2.2. CMPV is NP-hard even for two agents, ` = 0, x = 1, and k = |C|/2.
In the following proof, we give a polynomial-time many-one reduction from a special vari-
ant Half Vertex Cover of the Vertex Cover problem, where r is set to half the number
of vertices:
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Vertex Cover
Input: An undirected graph G and an integer r ∈ N.
Question: Is whether there is a set X ⊆ V (G) of size at most r such that G−X contains
no edge.
It is not difficult to see that Half Vertex Cover is NP-complete: We can reduce
any instance (G, r) of Vertex Cover to Half Vertex Cover by adding a clique
on |V (G)| − 2r + 2 vertices to G if r < |V (G)|/2, or adding enough isolated vertices to G
until r = |V (G)|/2.
Proof. Let I = (G = (V,E)) be an instance of Half Vertex Cover, and let E =
{e1, . . . , em} without loss of generality. We construct an instance I ′ = (A,C, u, k, `, x)
of CMPV in polynomial time as follows.
Construction: Set the set C of candidates equal to V , and the set A of agents equal
to {a1, a2}. Next, construct m voting profiles as follows. For profile ut, t ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
set ut(a1) = {v} and ut(a2) = {w}, where et = {v, w}. Finally, set k = |V |/2, ` = 0,
and x = 1. This finishes the construction.
Correctness: We claim that I is yes-instance if and only if I ′ is a yes-instance.
(⇒) Let X ⊆ V be a vertex cover of size at most |V |/2. We claim that the se-
quence (C1, . . . , Cm) with Ct = X for every t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is a solution to I ′. Suppose
towards a contradiction that this is not the case. Firstly, observe that Ct4Ct+1 = ∅ for every
t ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, and that |Ct| ≤ k for every t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Hence, there is a t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
such that scoret(Ct) = 0. This means that for edge et = {v, w}, both v, w 6∈ X, contradicting
the fact that X is a vertex cover of G. Hence, (C1, . . . , Cm) is a solution to I ′.
(⇐) Let (C1, . . . , Cm) be a solution to I ′. Note that since ` = 0, Ci = Cj for
every i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We claim that X := C1 is a vertex cover of G (note that |X| ≤ k).
Let t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be arbitrary but fixed. Since scoret(Ct) ≥ 1, we know that Ct ∩ et 6= ∅.
Hence, since X = Ct, edge et is covered by X. Since t was chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that X is a vertex cover of G of size at most k. J
NP-hardness of RMPV follows from the fact that we can reduce the specific variant of CMPV
that we proved to be NP-hard in Proposition 2.2 to RMPV without increasing the number
of agents.
I Lemma 2.3. There is an algorithm that, on every instance (A,C,U, k, `, x) with ` = 0
and k = |C|/2 of CMPV, computes an equivalent instance (A,C ′, U ′, k′, `′, x) of RMPV
with k′ = |C ′|/2, `′ = 2k′, and |U ′| = 2|U |+ 1 in polynomial time.
Proof. Let I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) with ` = 0, k = |C|/2, and τ voting profiles be an instance
of CMPV. We construct instance I ′ = (A,C ′, U ′, k′, `′, x) of RMPV with `′ = 2k′ in
polynomial time as follows.
Construction: Set the set of candidates C ′ = C unionmulti {z, y}, where z, y are new candidates not
in C. Next, construct 2 · τ + 1 voting profiles as follows. For all a ∈ A and all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}
set u′2t−1(a) = u2t−1(a) and u′2t(a) = {y}. Moreover, set u′2τ+1(a) = {z} for all a ∈ A.
Finally, set k′ = k + 1 and `′ = 2k′ = |C ′|. This finishes the construction.
Correctness: We claim that I is a yes-instance if and only if I ′ is a yes-instance.
(⇒) Let (C1, . . . , Cτ ) be a solution to I such that |C1| = k. Since ` = 0, we have
that Ct = Ct′ for every t, t′ ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. Let X := C1∪{z} and Y := C ′\X. Note that |X| =
|Y | = |C ′|/2. We claim that (C ′1, . . . , C ′2τ+1) with C ′2t−1 = X for every t ∈ {1, . . . , τ + 1}
and C ′2t = Y for every t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} is a solution to I ′. Since y ∈ Y , score2t(Y ) = |A| ≥ x
for every t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. Since u′2t−1(a) = u2t−1(a) for every a ∈ A and t ∈ {1, . . . , τ},
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and (C1, . . . , Cτ ) is a solution to I, we have score2t−1(X) ≥ x. Moreover, since z ∈ X, we
have score2τ+1(X) = |A| ≥ x. Lastly, as C ′t4C ′t+1 = C ′ for every t ∈ {1, . . . , 2τ}, the claim
follows.
(⇐) Let (C1, . . . , C2τ+1) be a solution to I ′. First observe that, due to ` = |C|, we have
that Ct4Ct+1 = C for every t ∈ {1, . . . , 2τ}. It follows that C2t−1 = C2t′−1 and z ∈ C2t−1
for every t, t′ ∈ {1, . . . , τ + 1}, and C2t = C2t′ and y ∈ C2t for every t, t′ ∈ {1, . . . , τ}.
We claim that (C ′1, C ′2, . . . , C ′τ ) with C ′i := C1 \ {z} is a solution to I. By construction,
scorei(C ′i) ≥ x, and as C ′i = C ′j and |C ′i| ≤ k, the claim follows. J
Combining Lemma 2.3 and Proposition 2.2, we get the following.
I Corollary 2.4. RMPV is NP-hard even for two agents, ` = 2k, x = 1, and k = |C|/2.
Theorem 2.1 now follows from Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.4.
Are ` = 0 (CMPV) and ` = 2k (RMPV) necessary? In fact, ` = 0 (CMPV) and ` = 2k
(RMPV) are not the only intractable cases. For instance, we have the following.
I Proposition 2.5. CMPV with ` = 1 and RMPV with ` = m− 1 = 2k − 2 are NP-hard.
I Lemma 2.6. CMPV is NP-hard for ` = 1.
Proof. Let I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) be an instance of CMPV with A = {a1, a2}, x = 1, and ` = 0.
We construct an instance I ′ = (A′, C ′, U ′, k′, `′, x′) of CMPV with A′ = {a1, . . . , a6},
C ′ = C ∪ {v′, v, w}, k′ = k + 2, `′ = 1, and x′ = x+ 4 in polynomial time as follows.
Construction: For each 1 ≤ t ≤ τ := τ(U), let a1, a2 approve the same candidates as
in ut. If t is even, then let a3, a4 approve v′ if t is divisible by four, and approve v otherwise.
If t is odd, then let a3, a4 approve w. Agents a5, a6 approve always w. This finishes the
construction.
Correctness: We claim that I is a yes-instance if and only if I ′ is a yes-instance.
(⇒) Let (C1, . . . , Cτ ) be a solution to C. We claim that the sequence (C ′1, . . . , C ′τ )
with Ct := Ct ∪ {w} if t is odd, Ct := Ct ∪ {v′, w} if t is even and divisible by four,
and Ct := Ct ∪ {v, w} if t is even and not divisible by four. Observe that |Ct| ≤ k + 2
and C ′t4C ′t+1 = {v′} or C ′t4C ′t+1 = {v}. Moreover, since in time step t, at least one
candidate of Ct is a approved by a1, a2, by construction we have scoret(C ′t) ≥ 5. This proves
the claim.
(⇐) Let (C ′1, . . . , C ′τ ) be a solution to I ′. Observe that every solution to I ′, w must be in
every committee, v′ must be in every committee in an even time step divisible by four, and v
must be in every committee in an even time step not divisible by four. Hence, C ′t4C ′t+1 = {v′}
or C ′t4C ′t+1 = {v} for every t ∈ {1, . . . , τ −1}. We claim that (C1, . . . , Cτ ) with Ct = C ′t∩C
is a solution to I. Observe that |Ct| ≤ k and that Ct4Ct+1 = (C ′t4C ′t+1)∩C = ∅. Moreover,
since for every t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} we have that scoret(C ′t) ≥ 5, at least one of a1, a2 must approve
a candidate in C ′t ∩ C = Ct. Thus, scoret(Ct) ≥ 1, and the claim follows. J
Similarly, having ` = 2k is not necessary for RMPV to be NP-hard.
I Lemma 2.7. RMPV is NP-hard for ` = m− 1 = 2k − 2.
Proof. Let I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) be an instance of RMPV with A = {a1, a2}, ` = 2k,
x = 1, and k = |C|/2. We construct an instance I ′ = (A′, C ′, U ′, k′, `′, x′) of CMPV
with A′ = {a1, . . . , a4}, C ′ = C ∪ {w}, k′ = k+ 1, `′ = 2k′ − 2, and x′ = x+ 2 in polynomial
time as follows.
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Construction: For each 1 ≤ t ≤ τ := τ(U), let a1, a2 approve the same candidates as in ut,
and a3, a4 approve w. Let u′1, . . . , u′τ denote the obtained voting profiles.
Correctness: We claim that I is a yes-instance if and only if I ′ is a yes-instance.
(⇒) Let (C1, . . . , Cτ ) be a solution to I. We claim that (C ′1, . . . , C ′τ ) with C ′t = Ct∪{w}
is a solution to I ′. Note that |C ′t| ≤ k+1, and that |C ′t4C ′t+1| = |Ct4Ct+1| ≥ 2k = 2k′−2 =
`′. Moreover, note that since x′ = 3, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} we have that a1, a2 approve a
candidate from C ′t, which is different to w. Hence, by construction, scoret(Ct) ≥ 1.
(⇐) Let (C ′1, . . . , C ′τ ) be a solution to I ′. Observe that for every solution to I ′, w must be
in every committee. Moreover, since `′ = |C ′| − 1 = |C|, we have that (Ct ∪Ct+1) \ {w} = C.
We claim that (C1, . . . , Cτ ) with Ct = C ′t \ {w} is a solution to I. Note that |Ct| ≤ k,
|Ct4Ct+1| = |C ′t4C ′t+1| ≥ `, and that scoret(Ct) = scoreC ′t − 2 ≥ x. Thus, the claim
follows. J
3 Role of `
In this section, we investigate the role of ` for our two problem variants. To start with, we
have the following easy observation.
I Observation 1. CMPV is polynomial-time solvable if ` = 2k and RMPV is polynomial-
time solvable if ` = 0.
Observation 1 suggests that while CMPV is NP-hard even for constant ` (Theorem 2.1),
this seems to be different for RMPV. In fact, next we prove that RMPV is contained in XP
regarding `.
I Theorem 3.1. Every instance I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) of RMPV with n agents, m candidates,
and τ voting profiles can be decided in O(τ · `4m4`+1n) time.
Note that we can assume that ` ≤ 2k. The crucial observation behind the XP-algorithm
comes from the structure of every solution C = (C1, . . . , Cτ ): Since |Ci4Ci+1| ≥ `, there
are X ⊆ Ci \ Ci+1 and Y ⊆ Ci+1 \ Ci such that X ∩ Y = ∅ and |X ∪ Y | ≥ `. This allows us
to build a directed graph D as follows.
I Definition 3.2. Given an instance I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) of RMPV, the in-out graph of I
is a directed graph DI with vertex set
V = V 1 ∪ · · · ∪ V τ−1 ∪ {s, t} where
V i = {viX,Y | X,Y ⊆ C, |X|, |Y | ≤ `,X ∩ Y = ∅, |X ∪ Y | ≥ `},
containing the arcs (s, v1X,Y ) if and only if there is a k-sized committee at time step 1
containing X being disjoint from Y with score at least x, the arcs (t, vτ−1X,Y ) if and only if there
is a k-sized committee at time step τ containing Y being disjoint from X with score at least x,
and an arc (viX,Y , v
j
X′,Y ′) if and only if (i) j = i+ 1, X ∩X ′ = Y ′ ∩ Y = ∅, and (ii) there is
a k-sized committee at time step i + 1 containing Y ∪X ′ being disjoint from X ∪ Y ′ with
score at least x.
With an XP-running time (regarding `), we can compute the in-out graph for every given
instance.
I Lemma 3.3. Given an instance I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) of RMPV with n agents, m candid-
ates, and τ voting profiles, the in-out graph DI of I can be computed in O(τ · `4m4`+1n) time.
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Proof. We can compute each Vi in O(`2m2`) time by brute forcing every pair of candidate
subsets each of size at most `. Hence, we can compute V in O(τ · `2m2`) time. The arcs
incident with s and t can be computed in O(n+m) time, same for conditions (i) and (ii),
resulting in an overall running time in O(τ · `4m4`+1n). J
We prove that deciding an instance of RMPV can be done through deciding whether there
is an s-t path in the instance’s in-out graph.
I Lemma 3.4. Let I be an instance of RMPV and DI its in-out graph. Then, there is
an s-t path in DI if and only if I is a yes-instance.
Proof. Let I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) be an instance of RMPV, and DI the in-out graph for I.
(⇒) By construction, we know that if there is an s-t path in DI , then it is of the
form P = (s, v1X1,Y1 , . . . , v
τ−1
Xτ−1,Yτ−1 , t). Since arc (s, v
1
X1,Y1
) exists, by construction there is
a k-size committee C1 containing X but disjoint from Y of score at least x (similar for Cτ ).
Since the arc (viXi,Yi , v
i+1
Xi+1,Yi+1
) exists, at time step i+ 1 there is a k-size committee Ci+1
containing Yi∪Xi+1 but disjoint from Xi∪Yi+1 of score at least x. Observe that Ci4Ci+1 ⊇
Xi ∪ Yi and thus, of size at least `. then we find in each time step a committee of score x,
and consecutive committees differ in at least ` elements.
(⇐) Assume there is a solution C = (C1, . . . , Cτ ). For every i ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1},
let Xi ⊆ Ci \ Ci+1, Yi ⊆ Ci+1 \ Ci. Note that C1 is a committee containing X but disjoint
from Y of score at least x in time step one, and thus arc (s, v1X1,Y1) exists (analogously
for Cτ and arc (vτ−1Xτ−1,Yτ−1 , t)). We claim that there is an arc from v
i
Xi,Yi
to vi+1Xi+1,Yi+1 for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 2}. Note that since Xi ∩Ci+1 = ∅, we have Xi ∩Xi+1 = ∅ (analogously
for Y ). Moreover, Ci+1 is a k-size committee with score at least x (since C is a solution),
and it contains Yi ∪Xi+1, and is disjoint from Xi ∪ Yi+1. Hence, the arc exists. It follows
that P = (s, v1X1,Y1 , . . . , v
τ−1
Xτ−1,Yτ−1 , t) forms an s-t path in DI . J
Given Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, we are set to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) be an instance of RMPV with n agents, m
candidates, and τ voting profiles. First, construct the in-out graph DI of I in O(τ ·`4m4`+1n)
time (Lemma 3.3). Next, in time linear in the size of DI check for an s-t path in DI . Due
to Lemma 3.4, if an s-t path is found, then report that I is a yes-instance, and otherwise, if
no such s-t path is found, then report that I is a no-instance, J
We remark that the proof of Lemma 3.4 contains the description of how to make the algorithm
constructive (that is, if one requires to return a solution).
4 Size of a Committee and of Their Sequence
In this section, we investigate the role of the committee size k and the parameter k + τ
describing the size k · τ of the solution—a sequence of committees. Firstly, we prove that
CMPV and RMPV are contained in XP when parameterized by k.
I Theorem 4.1. CMPV and RMPV both admit an O(τ · k2m2k+1n) algorithm and hence
are contained in XP when parameterized by k.
We will compute in XP-running time an auxiliary directed graph in which we then check for
the existence of an s-t path witnessing a yes-instance.
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Proof. Let I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) be an instance of CMPV (or RMPV) with n agents, m
candidates, and τ voting profiles. we compute the following directed graph D = (V,A)
with vertex set V = {s, t} unionmulti V 1 unionmulti · · · unionmulti V τ , where V t = {vtX | X ⊆ C, |X| ≤ k, scoret(X) ≥
x}, and arc set A composed of the sets {(s, v) | v ∈ V 1}, {(v, t) | v ∈ V τ}, and for
each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1} the sets {(vtX , vt+1Y ) | |X4Y | ≤ `} in the conservative variant
(and {(vtX , vt+1Y ) | |X4Y | ≥ `} in the revolutionary variant). Note that there are at
most τ · k(mk ) + 2 vertices and at most (τ − 1) · (k(mk ))2 + 2k(mk ) arcs. Hence, D can be
constructed in O(τ · k2m2k+1n) time. We claim that I is a yes-instance if and only if D
admits an s-t path. Note that we can check for an s-t path in D in time linear in the size
of D.
(⇒) Let (C1, . . . , Cτ ) be a solution to I. We claim that P = (s, v1C1 , . . . , vτCτ , t) is an
s-t path in D. Clearly, the arcs (s, v1C1) and (v
τ
Cτ
, t) are in A. For each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1},
the arc (vtCt , v
t+1
Ct+1
) exists since |Ct4Ct+1| ≤ ` (≥ ` in the revolutionary case). Hence, P is
an s-t path in D.
(⇐) Let P = (s, v1C1 , . . . , vτCτ , t) be an s-t path in D. We claim that (C1, . . . , Cτ ) is
a solution to I. First observe that |Ct| ≤ k and scoret(Ct) ≥ x. Moreover, we have that
|Ct4Ct+1| ≤ ` (≥ ` in the revolutionary case) for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}. The claim thus
follows. J
Clearly, since k ≤ m, Theorem 4.1 proves both problem variants to be fixed-parameter
tractable when parameterized by m.
I Corollary 4.2. CMPV and RMPV both are solvable in 2O(m log(m)) · τn time.
Given Corollary 4.2, the question arises whether Theorem 4.1 can be improved to show fixed-
parameter tractability regarding k. Next we first prove that this seems unlikely for CMPV
and then discuss the question for RMPV.
CMPV. We first state Theorem 4.3 and then prove it using several intermediate lemmas.
I Theorem 4.3. CMPV is W[1]-hard when parameterized by k + τ , even if ` = 0.
In the reduction behind the proof of Theorem 4.3, we employ Sidon sets defined subsequently.
I Definition 4.4. A Sidon set is a set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sb} of b natural numbers such that
every pairwise sum of the elements in S is different.
Sidon sets can be computed efficiently.
I Lemma 4.5. A Sidon set of size b can be computed in O(b) time if b is encoded in unary.
Proof. Suppose we aim at obtaining a Sidon set S = {s1, . . . , sb}. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , b},
we compute si := 2bˆi+ (i2 mod bˆ), where bˆ is the smallest prime number greater than b [8].
Thus, given bˆ, one can compute S in linear time.
It remains to show how to find bˆ in linear time. Due to the Bertrand-Chebyshev [18]
theorem, we have that bˆ < 2b. Searching all prime numbers smaller than 2b is doable in
O(b) time (see, for example, an intuitive algorithm by Gries and Misra [14]). J
We are set to prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We reduce from Multicolored Clique that is W[1]-complete
when parameterized by the solution size [9, 17]. An instance Iˆ of Multicolored Clique
consists of a q-partite graph G = (V1 unionmulti V2 unionmulti · · · unionmulti Vq, E) and the task is to decide whether
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there is a set K of q pairwise connected vertices, each from a distinct part. For brevity,
for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, i < j, let Eji be a set of edges connecting vertices from parts Vi
and Vj ; thus, E =
⋃
i,j∈{1,...,q},i<j E
j
i .
Construction. In the corresponding instance I of CMPV, we let all vertices and edges
in G be candidates. Then, we define three gadgets: the vertex selection gadget, the edge
selection gadget, and the coherence gadget. Further, we show how to use the gadgets to
construct I. Instance I will be constructed in a way that its solution is a single committee of
size exactly q +
(
q
2
)
corresponding to vertices and edges of a clique witnessing a yes-instance
of Iˆ (if one exists). To define the gadgets, we use a value x that we explicitly define at the
end of the construction.
Vertex selection gadget: Fix some part Vi, i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. The vertex selection gadget
for i ensures that exactly one vertex from Vi is selected. We construct the gadget by forming
a preference profile p(Vi) consisting of x · |Vi| agents such that each vertex v ∈ Vi is approved
by exactly x agents.
Edge selection gadget: Similarly, for each two parts Vi and Vj such that i < j, we construct
the edge selection gadget that allows to select exactly one edge from Eji . Accordingly, we
build a preference profile p(Eji ) consisting of x · |Eji | agents. Again, each edge in Eji is
approved by exactly x agents.
Coherence gadget: For the construction of the coherence gadget, let h := |⋃i∈{1,...,q} Vi|
and let S = {s1, . . . , sh} be a Sidon set computed according to Lemma 4.5. We define a
bijective fucntion id :
⋃
i∈{1,...,q} Vi → S associating each vertex of G with its (unique) id.
Now, the construction of the coherence gadget for some pair {Vi, Vj} of parts such that i < j
goes as follows. We introduce two preference profiles p((i, j)) and p′((i, j)). In preference
profile p((i, j)), (i) each candidate v ∈ Vi ∪ Vj is approved by exactly id(v) agents and (ii)
each edge e = {v, v′} ∈ Eji is approved by exactly (x− id(v)− id(v′)) agents. In preference
profile p′((i, j)), (i) each candidate v ∈ Vi ∪ Vj is approved by exactly x2 − id(v) agents and
(ii) each edge e = {v, v′} ∈ Eji is approved by exactly (id(v) + id(v′)) agents.
Having all the gadgets defined it remains to use them to form the agents and the preference
profiles of instance I; and to define x, `, and k. Since we want to have a committee consisting
of q vertices and
(
q
2
)
edges, we let k := q +
(
q
2
)
. We aim at a single committee, thus we
set ` = 0, which enforces that the committee must stay the same over time. Further, we
set x = 2sh. Finally, to form the preference profiles of I we put together, in any order,
vertex selection gadgets for every part Vi, i ∈ {1, . . . , q} as well as edge selection gadgets and
coherence gadgets for every pair {Vi, Vj} of parts such that i < j. As for the agents of I,
with each gadget G we add a separate set of agents needed to implement G making sure that
all other agents introduced by all other gadgets are approving no candidate in their voting
profiles occurring in G.
Running Time. The reduction builds a polynomial number (with respect to the input
size) of copies of gadgets. However, the construction time of the coherence gadget heavily
depends on the computation of Sidon set S (of size h) and the value of its largest element sh.
Since h is linearly bounded in the size of the input, due to Lemma 4.5, we get a polynomial
running time (with respect to the input size) of computing S. As a by-product we get that
the largest element of S is also polynomially upper-bounded (with respect to the input size).
Correctness. Naturally, if instance I of CMPV is a yes-instance, then there is a committee
that is witnessing this fact; otherwise, such a committee does not exist. Since the candidates
are all vertices and edges of graph G, we refer to edges and vertices being part of some
committee as, respectively, selected vertices and edges.
On the way to prove the correctness of the reduction, we state the following lemma about
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the coherence gadget.
I Lemma 4.6. For a pair {Vi, Vj} of parts such that i < j, let C be a committee selecting
exactly one vertex from either of them, v, v′ respectively, and exactly one edge e ∈ Eji
connecting some vertices of parts Vi and Vj. Then, the scores of C for the profiles of the
coherence gadget for parts Vi and Vj are at least x if and only if e = {v, v′}.
Proof. Assume that a selected edge connects vertices u and u′ from, respectively, part Vi and
part Vj . Let us compute the scores of C for profiles p((i, j)) and p′((i, j)) of the coherence
gadget for i and j (note that due to assumptions on C only candidates v, v′, and e contribute
to the scores):
scorep((i,j))(C) = id(v) + id(v′) + x− id(u)− id(u′), (1)
scorep′((i,j))(C) =
x
2 − id(v) +
x
2 − id(v
′) + id(u) + id(u′). (2)
If both of the scores are at least x, after simplifying the equations we arrive at:
id(v) + id(v′) ≥ id(u) + id(u′) ∧ id(u) + id(u′) ≥ id(v) + id(v′). (3)
This, in turn, simply means that:
id(u) + id(u′) = id(v) + id(v′). (4)
Recall that the image of bijective function id(·) is a Sidon set. Thus, by the definition of the
Sidon set, Equation (4) is true if and only if {v, v′} = {u, u′} = e.
The opposite direction follows directly from the definition of Sidon sets because all id(·)-
terms in Equation (1) and Equation (2) cancel out resulting in both scores being x. J
Analogously, we provide the following lemma that describes the role of the vertex and edge
selection gadgets.
I Lemma 4.7. Every committee witnessing a yes-instance selects exactly one vertex from
each part of G and exactly
(
q
2
)
edges, one for each distinct pair {Vi, Vj} of parts. Additionally,
the scores of such a committee C in all vertex and edge selection gadgets are exactly x.
Proof. Let us fix a committee C witnessing a yes-instance. Towards a contradiction, assume
that there exists a part Vi a vertex of which is not selected. Then, since in profile p(Vi) only
vertices from part Vi are approved, the score of C in p(Vi) is zero; the contradiction. Similarly,
assume that there is a pair {Vi, Vj} of parts such that no edge in Eji is selected by C. Again,
by an analogous argument, if this is the case, then the scores of C in profiles p(Eji ) and p′(Eij)
are zero which gives a contradiction. From the fact that there are exactly q vertex selection
gadgets and exactly
(
q
2
)
edge selection gadgets, it follows that C selects exactly one vertex
from each part of G and exactly one edge for a pair of parts. By the construction of the
vertex and edge selection gadgets, indeed each of them gives score exactly x. J
Having the above lemmas, we finally show the correctness of our reduction. In one
direction, suppose K is a clique of size q in graph G of an instance Iˆ of Multicolored
Clique. We construct a committee C selecting all vertices of K and all edges connecting
the vertices in K. Indeed, the necessary condition from Lemma 4.7 is met because of the
definition of a clique and the fact that K is a clique of size q. Again by the definition of a
clique, for every two vertices from distinct parts, committee C selects the edge that connects
them; thus, by Lemma 4.6, committee C is witnessing the positive answer.
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For the opposite direction, suppose there is no clique in G of Iˆ. We show that there is
no committee C witnessing a yes-instance. Due to Lemma 4.7 it follows that C selects a
vertex for each part of G and an edge for each pair of parts. However, since there is no clique
in G every committee C there exists at least one pair {v, v′} of vertices from distinct parts
that are not connected with an edge. Thus, due to Lemma 4.6 at least in one coherence
gadget there is at least one profile for which the score of C is below x; which finishes the
argument. J
RMPV. Interestingly, we can transfer the intractability result to RMPV only regarding τ .
I Theorem 4.8. RMPV is W[1]-hard when parameterized by τ .
To prove Theorem 4.8, we aim for employing Lemma 2.3, which forms a parameterized
reduction regarding τ . To this end, we need firstly to reduce any instance with ` = 0
of CMPV to an equivalent instance of CMPV with k = |C|/2 and ` = 0 such that the
number of resulting voting profiles only depends on τ .
I Lemma 4.9. There is an algorithm that, on every instance (A,C,U, k, `, x) with ` =
0 of CMPV, computes in polynomial time an equivalent instance (A′, C ′, U ′, k′, `′, x′)
of CMPV with k′ = |C ′|/2, `′ = 0, and |U ′| = |U |.
Proof. Let I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) with ` = 0 be an instance of CMPV. We construct an
instance I ′ = (A′, C ′, U ′, k′, `′, x′) of CMPV with k′ = |C ′|/2, `′ = 0, and |U ′| = |U |, as
follows.
Construction: Initially, we set I ′ to I. If k = |C|/2, we are done. If k > |C|/2, then we
add 2k − |C| candidates to C, forming C ′. If k < |C|/2, then we add |C| − 2k candidates
to C, say set C∗, forming C ′ = C ∪ C∗. Moreover, we add |A| · (|C| − 2k) agents to A,
say A∗, forming A′ = A ∪ A∗, where for each c ∈ C∗, in each stage, exactly |A| of the
new agents approve c (this forms U ′). Note that |U ′| = |U |. Set k′ = |C ′|/2, `′ = 0,
and x′ = x + |A|(|C| − 2k). Since correctness for the cases k = |C|/2 and k > |C|/2 is
immediate, we prove in the following correctness for the case of k < |C|/2.
Correctness: In the case of k < |C|/2, we claim that I is a yes-instance if and only if I ′
is a yes-instance. yes-instance (⇒) Let C = (C1, . . . , Cτ ) be a solution to I. We claim
that (C ′1, . . . , C ′τ ) with C ′i = Ci∪C∗ is a solution to I ′. First note that |C ′t| ≤ |Ct|+|C|−2k ≤
|C| − k = |C ′|/2. Moreover, we have that |C ′t4C ′t+1| = |Ct4Ct+1| = 0. Finally, we have
that scoret(C ′t) = scoret(Ct) + |A|(|C| − 2k) ≥ x+ |A|(|C| − 2k) = x′.
(⇐) Let C′ = (C ′1, . . . , C ′τ ) be a solution to I ′. First observe that C∗ ⊆ C ′t for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. Suppose not, that is, there is a t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} and c ∈ C∗ such that c 6∈
C ′t. Then the score of C ′t is at most |A| + |A|(|C| − 2k − 1) = |A|(|C| − 2k) < x′, a
contradiction to the fact that C′ is a solution. We claim that (C1, . . . , Cτ ) with Ct = C∗t \C∗
a solution to I. Note that |Ct| = |C ′t| − (|C| − 2k) ≤ (2|C| − 2k)/2 − (|C| − 2k) = k, and
that |Ct4Ct+1| = |C ′t4C ′t+1| = 0. Finally, note that scoret(Ct) = scoret(C ′t)−|A|(|C|−2k) ≥
x+ |A|(|C| − 2k)− |A|(|C| − 2k) = x. J
Proof of Theorem 4.8. Using first Lemma 4.9 and then Lemma 2.3 forms a parameterized
reduction from CMPV to RMPV regarding the parameter τ . Due to Theorem 4.3, the
claim then follows. J
We leave open whether RMPV is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by k or
even by `.
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5 Tractability with a Constant Number of Stages
In this section, we study for the complexity regarding the parameter lifetime τ . For multistage
or temporal (graph) problems, either the problems are NP-hard for constant lifetime or they
are (trivially) fixed-parameter tractable regarding the lifetime. We prove that for CMPV
and RMPV, this is different: Both are W[1]-hard (Theorems 4.3 and 4.8), yet contained in
XP due to the following.
I Theorem 5.1. When parameterized by τ , CMPV and RMPV are contained in XP.
Proof. We describe a dynamic programming algorithm using the key insight that there are
only 2τ possible subsets of committees for a single candidate to be part of. With τ being
constant, we can effort to iterate through all these possibilities. Even more importantly,
when building up all committees simultaneously in m phases, with increasing i, we consider
in each phase i only committee members among the first i candidates. Herein, we keep track
of the sizes, symmetric differences, and scores of all τ committees using only polynomially
many table entries.
To implement the above idea, we define a boolean dynamic programming table T [i,
k1, . . . , kτ , d1, . . . , dτ−1, s1, . . . , sτ ] with 0 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ kt ≤ k, 0 ≤ dt ≤ 2k, 0 ≤ st ≤ n and
the following interpretation. Let T [i, k1, . . . , kτ , d1, . . . , dτ−1, s1, . . . , sτ ] be true if and only
if there are committees C1, . . . , Cτ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci} with
|Ct| = kt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ},
|Ct4Ct+1| = dt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}, and
scoret(Ct) = st for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}.
It is easy to see (by the definition of the table) that there is a solution to our problem if and
only if T [m, k′1, . . . , k′τ , d′1, . . . , d′τ−1, s′1, . . . , s′τ ] is true for some combination of k′1, . . . , k′τ ,
d′1, . . . , d
′
τ−1, s′1, . . . , s′τ with k′t ≤ k for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, d′t ≤ ` (respectively d′t ≥ `, in
the revolutionary case) for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}, and s′t ≥ x for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. The
table is of size O(m · k2τ · nτ ). It remains to show how to fill the table and that each table
entry can be computed efficiently.
As initialization, we set T [0, 0, . . . , 0] to true and all other table entries T [0, . . . ] to false.
For each i > 0, we compute all entries T [i, . . . ] as follows, assuming that the entries T [i−1, . . . ]
have been computed. For each candidate fingerprint F ⊆ 2{1,...,τ} we set T [i+ 1, k1, . . . , kτ ,
d1, . . . , dτ−1, s1, . . . , sτ ] to true if T [i, k′1, . . . , k′τ , d′1, . . . , d′τ−1, s′1, . . . , s′τ ] is true where for
each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} we have k′t =
{
kt − 1 if t ∈ F,
kt otherwise
, d′t =
{
dt − 1 if t ∈ F xor t+ 1 ∈ F,
dt otherwise
,
and s′t =
{
st − |u−1t (ci+1)| if t ∈ F,
st otherwise
. We set all other entries T [i+ 1, . . . ] to false.
Running time. Computing all table entries T [i, . . . ] for some i costs O(2τ ) time steps for
setting the “true”-entries and another O(k2τ · nτ ) time steps for setting the “false”-entries.
Hence, the whole table can be computed in O(m · k2τ · nτ ) time.
The correctness is deferred to the appendix (F). Correctness. We show via induction
that each computed table entry T [i, k1, . . . , kτ , d1, . . . , dτ−1, s1, . . . , sτ ] is indeed set to
true if and only if there are committees C1, . . . , Cτ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci} with |Ct| = kt for
each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, |Ct4Ct+1| = dt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}, and scoret(Ct) = st for
each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. This is trivially correct for all table entries with i = 0. Now, assume that
for some i ∈ [m− 1] it holds that T [i, k1, . . . , kτ , d1, . . . , dτ−1, s1, . . . , sτ ] is set to true if and
only if there are committees C1, . . . , Cτ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci} with |Ct| = kt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ},
|Ct4Ct+1| = dt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}, and scoret(Ct) = st for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. We
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show that also each table entry T [i+1, k1, . . . , kτ , d1, . . . , dτ−1, s1, . . . , sτ ] is set to true if and
only if there are committees C1, . . . , Cτ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci+1} with |Ct| = kt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ},
|Ct4Ct+1| = dt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}, and scoret(Ct) = st for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}.
Let T [i+ 1, k∗1 , . . . , k∗τ , d∗1, . . . , d∗τ−1, s∗1, . . . , s∗τ ] be the table entry of interest.
First, assume that T [i + 1, k∗1 , . . . , k∗τ , d∗1, . . . , d∗τ−1, s∗1, . . . , s∗τ ] is set to true. Herein,
let F ∗ ⊆ 2{1,...,τ} be the fingerprint used when the table entry was set to true. This
implies that T [i, k′1, . . . , k′τ , d′1, . . . , d′τ−1, s′1, . . . , s′τ ] was true with k′t =
{
k∗t − 1 if t ∈ F ∗
k∗t otherwise
,
d′t =
{
d∗t − 1 if t ∈ F ∗ xor t+ 1 ∈ F ∗
dt otherwise
, and s′t =
{
s∗t − |u−1t (ci+1)| if t ∈ F ∗
s∗t otherwise
. Thus,
there are committees C ′1, . . . , C ′τ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci} with |C ′t| = k′t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ},
|C ′t4C ′t+1| = d′t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}, and scoret(C ′t) = s′t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}.
It is easy to verify that we obtain the desired committees C∗1 , . . . , C∗τ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci+1}
via by C∗t =
{
C∗t ∪ {ci+1} if t ∈ F ∗
C∗t otherwise
and it holds that |C∗t | = k∗t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ},
|C∗t4C∗t+1| = d∗t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}, and scoret(C∗t ) = s∗t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}.
Second, assume that T [i + 1, k∗1 , . . . , k∗τ , d∗1, . . . , d∗τ−1, s∗1, . . . , s∗τ ] is set to false. Assume
towards a contradiction that there are committees C∗1 , . . . , C∗τ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci+1} with |C∗t | = k∗t
for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, |C∗t4C∗t+1| = d∗t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}, and scoret(C∗t ) = s∗t for
each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. Obviously, there must be committees C ′1, . . . , C ′τ ⊆ {c1, . . . , ci} via C ′t =
C∗t \ {ci+1} with |C ′t| = k′t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, |C ′t4C ′t+1| = d′t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1},
and scoret(C ′t) = s′t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. Moreover, by our inductive assumption, we
have T [i, k′1, . . . , k′τ , d′1, . . . , d′τ−1, s′1, . . . , s′τ ] =true. This, using the fingerprint F ∗ = {t |
ci+1 ∈ C∗t }, our algorithm would have set T [i+ 1, k∗1 , . . . , k∗τ , d∗1, . . . , d∗τ−1, s∗1, . . . , s∗τ ] to true;
a contradiction. J
6 On Efficient Data Reduction for Parameter Combinations
In this section, we investigate for the complexity regarding the parameter combinations m+n
(Section 6.1), m+τ (Section 6.2), and n+τ (Section 6.3). Since we already know regarding m,
we have fixed-parameter tractability (Corollary 4.2) for both problem variants, we focus
on efficient data reduction. We prove that m+ τ allows for and m+ n does not allow for
efficient data reduction (under some complexity theoretic assumption). We further prove
that n+ τ allows for efficient data reduction; surprisingly, since for each parameter alone we
have para-NP-hardness (for n) and W[1]-hardness (for τ).
6.1 Number of candidates and agents combined
As to our surprise, parameterized by m+ n, that is by all dimensions of an input except for
the time aspect (number of stages), efficient data reduction seems unlikely.
I Theorem 6.1. Each of CMPV and RMPV admits no problem kernel of size polynomial
in m+ n unless NP ⊆ coNP / poly.
To prove Theorem 6.1, we are going to prove that both, CMPV and RMPV, when para-
meterized by m + n are AND-compositional. That is, there is an algorithm taking p
instance I1, . . . , Ip, each with the same number n of agents, m of candidates, and τ of profiles,
and constructs in time polynomial in
∑p
i=1 |Ii| an instance I such that the number of agents
and candidates is in (m+n)O(1), and that I is a yes-instance if and only if each of I1, . . . , Ip
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is yes-instance. When a parameterized problem admits an AND-composition, then it admits
no polynomial kernel unless NP ⊆ coNP / poly.
We first study the case of CMPV.
I Construction 1. Consider p instances I1, . . . , Ip of CMPV with k, x ∈ N and ` = 1, each
with n agents Ai = {ai1, . . . , ain}, m candidates Ci = {ci1, . . . , cim}, and τ voting profiles.
Add the agent set A = {a1, . . . , an} ∪ {â1, . . . , ân} and candidate set C = {c1, . . . , cn} ∪ {z}.
Arrange the p voting profiles consecutively, where we identify each agent aij with aj and each
candidate cij with cj . Moreover, each agent âj approves z. Next, between the last voting
profile and the first voting profile of two consecutive instances, add 2k profiles where all
agents approve z (we call them transfer profiles). Set x′ = x + n, k′ = k + 1, and `′ = 1.
Note that τ ′ = pτ + 2k(p− 1). 
By construction, we have the following.
I Observation 2. Let I ′ from Construction 2 be a yes-instance of CMPV. Then in every
solution (C1, . . . , Cτ ′) it holds true that z ∈ Ct in all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ ′}.
Proof. Let C = (C1, . . . , Cτ ′) be a solution to I ′. Assume there is i ∈ {1, . . . , τ ′} such
that z 6∈ Ci. Then, scorei(Ci) ≤ |A| − n = n < n + x = x′, contradicting that C is a
solution. J
I Lemma 6.2. Let I ′ be the instance obtained from Construction 2 given I1, . . . , Ip. Then I ′
is a yes-instance if and only if each instance of I1, . . . , Ip a yes-instance.
Proof. (⇒) Let C = (C1, C1,2, C2, . . . , Cp) be a solution for I ′, where Ci is sequence of
committee for the voting profiles obtained from instance Ii, and Ci,i+1 is a sequence of
committees for the transfer voting profiles between the consecutive instances Ii and Ii+1.
We claim that Ci without z forms a solution to instance Ii for every i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Due
to Observation 2, we have that z is contained in each committee in Ci. Moreover, each
committee admits a score of at least x′ = x+ n, and hence as z contributes n to the score,
each committee admits a score of at least x in the respective voting profile in instance Ii.
(⇐) Let each of I1, . . . , Ip be a yes-instance, and let Cq = (C1q , . . . , Cτq ) be a solution
to Iq for each q ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Note that Ĉq = (Ĉ1q , . . . , Ĉτq ) where Ĉtq contains the set {cj |
cqj ∈ Ctq} and z is a sequence of committees that is a partial solution to I ′ on the voting
profiles corresponding to Iq. It remains to construct a sequence Cq,q+1 = (C1q,q+1, . . . , C2kq,q+1)
for each q ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. Let Ĉτq = {z} ∪ {b1, . . . , br} and let Ĉ1q+1 = {z} ∪ {d1, . . . , ds}.
Initially, set Ctq,q+1 = {z} for all t ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}. For t ≤ r, set Ctq,q+1 = Ĉτq \
⋃t
i=1 bi.
For t ≥ 2k − s + 1, and Ctq,q+1 = Ĉ1q+1 \
⋃2k−t+1
i=1 di. Clearly, |Ctq,q+1| ≤ k′ and since each
contains z, each admits a score of 2n. Finally, by construction we have |Ctq,q+14Ct+1q,q+1| ≤ 1
for every t ∈ {1, . . . , 2k − 1}, |Cτq4C1q,q+1| ≤ 1, and |C1q+14C2kq,q+1| ≤ 1. Altogether,
C := (Ĉ1, C1,2, Ĉ2, . . . , Ĉp) forms a solution to I ′. J
For RMPV, the construction is similar to Construction 2 in the sense of using transition
profiles; However, this time, we only need three.
I Construction 2. Consider p instances I1, . . . , Ip of RMPV with k, x ∈ N and ` = 2k,
each with n agents Ai = {ai1, . . . , ain}, m = ` candidates Ci = {ci1, . . . , cim}, and τ voting
profiles. Add the agent set A = {a1, . . . , an} ∪ {âij | 0 ≤ i ≤ `, 1 ≤ j ≤ n} and candidate
set C = {c1, . . . , cn} ∪ {z, y1, . . . , y`}. Arrange the p voting profiles consecutively, where
we identify each agent aij with aj and each candidate cij with cj . Moreover, each agent â0j
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approves z, and each âij approves yi. Next, between the last voting profile and the first
voting profile of two consecutive instances, add one profile where all agents approve z (we
call it again transfer profile). Set x′ = x + n · (` + 1), k′ = k + ` + 1, and `′ = `. Note
that τ ′ = pτ + (p− 1). 
Again, similar to the case of CMPV, we observe that z must be contained in each
committee when we are facing a solution.
I Observation 3. Let I ′ from Construction 2 be a yes-instance of RMPV. Then in every
solution (C1, . . . , Cτ ′) it holds true that z ∈ Ct in all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ ′} and {y1, . . . , y`} ∈ Ct
if Ct is no transition profile.
I Lemma 6.3. Let I ′ be the instance obtained from Construction 2 given I1, . . . , Ip. Then I ′
is a yes-instance if and only if each instance of I1, . . . , Ip a yes-instance.
Proof. (⇒) Let C = (C1, C1,2, C2, . . . , Cp) be a solution for I ′, where Ci is sequence of
committee for the voting profiles obtained from instance Ii, and Ci,i+1 is a sequence of
committees for the transfer voting profiles between the consecutive instances Ii and Ii+1.
We claim that Ci without z forms a solution to instance Ii for every i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Due
to Observation 3, we have that z and {y1, . . . , y`} are contained in each committee in Ci.
Moreover, each committee admits a score of at least x′ = x+ n · (`+ 1), and hence as each
of z, y1, . . . , y` contributes n to the score, each committee admits a score of at least x in the
respective voting profile in instance Ii.
(⇐) Let each of I1, . . . , Ip be a yes-instance, and let Cq = (C1q , . . . , Cτq ) be a solution
to Iq for each q ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Note that Ĉq = (Ĉ1q , . . . , Ĉτq ) where Ĉtq contains the set {cj |
cqj ∈ Ctq} and z is a sequence of committees that is a partial solution to I ′ on the voting
profiles corresponding to Iq. It remains to construct the transition profiles Cq,q+1 for
each q ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. Let Ĉτq = {z} unionmulti {y1, . . . , y`} unionmulti {b1, . . . , br} and let Ĉ1q+1 = {z} unionmulti
{y1, . . . , y`} unionmulti {d1, . . . , ds}. Set Cq,q+1 = {z}. Clearly, |Cq,q+1| ≤ k′, Moreover, since in
the transition profiles all agents approve z, committee Cq,q+1 has score A′ ≥ x′. Finally,
observe that {y1, . . . , y`} is a subset of each of Ĉτq4Cq,q+1 and of Cq,q+14Ĉ1q+1, and hence
each symmetric difference is of size at least `. Altogether, C := (Ĉ1, C1,2, Ĉ2, . . . , Ĉp) forms a
solution to I ′. J
6.2 Number of candidates and lifetime combined
In the previous section, we have seen that efficient data reduction for all dimensions but τ
is unlikely. This indicates that the lifetime is crucial for efficient data reduction. In fact,
considering m+ τ , we can first reduce our problem to a weighted version, shrink the weights,
and then reduce it back to our problem, thereby obtaining a problem kernel of size polynomial
in m+ τ .
I Theorem 6.4. CMPV and RMPV admits problem kernels of size polynomial in m+ τ .
The weighted version of each problem takes number m of candidates many agents,
where ai assigns a weight to candidate i (this corresponds to the number of agents approving
candidate i in the unweighted variant). Formally, for CMPV the weighted version is defined
as follows:
Weighted CMPV (W-CMPV)
Input: A set W of weight vectors w1, . . . , wτ ∈ Nm0 , and three integers k, `, x.
Question: Are there subsets C1, . . . , Cτ of {1, . . . ,m} each of size at most k such that
(i)
∑
i∈Ct w
t
i ≥ x for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, and (ii) |Ct4Ct+1| ≤ ` for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}?
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The reduction from CMPV to W-CMPV is obvious (the sum of weights equals n).
I Observation 4. There is a polynomial-time many-one reduction from CMPV to W-CMPV
with τ weight vectors from {0, . . . , n}m.
Proof. For each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, set wti equal to the number of approvals of candidate ci in
the tth utility function, that is, wti = |u−1t (ci)|. J
We can shrink the weights of the weighted version of each of our problems the following
result due to Frank and Tardos [12].
I Proposition 6.5 ([12, Section 3]). There is an algorithm that, on input w ∈ Qd and
integer N , computes in polynomial time a vector ŵ ∈ Zd with
(i) ‖ŵ‖∞ ≤ 24d3Nd(d+2) such that
(ii) sign(w>b) = sign(ŵ>b) for all b ∈ Zd with ‖b‖1 ≤ N − 1.
Proposition 6.5 now gives the following.
I Lemma 6.6. There is an algorithm that, given and instance I = (W,k, `, x) of W-
CMPV, computes in polynomial time an instance I ′ := (W ′ = {ŵ1, . . . , ŵτ}, k, `, x̂) such
that (i) ‖ŵt‖∞, |x̂| ∈ 2O(m3τ3) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, and (ii) C is a solution to I if and only
if it is a solution to I ′.
Proof. Let ω ∈ Nm·τ0 the concatenation of the weight vectors inW , and let w := (ω, x). Apply
Proposition 6.5 to w with N = k + 2 (note that d = m · τ + 1) to obtain a vector ŵ = (ω̂, x̂).
Property (i) holds true by Proposition 6.5(i). Let C = (C1, . . . , Cτ ) be a sequence of subsets
of {1, . . . ,m}. Let bt ∈ {0, 1}m be the vector associated with Ct (that is, bti = 1 if and
only if i ∈ Ct). Then, by Proposition 6.5(i) (since ‖bt‖1 ≤ k), (bt,−1)>(wt, x) ≥ 0 if and
only if (bt,−1)>(ŵt, x̂) ≥ 0. Hence, C is a solution to I if and only if it is to I ′, proving
property (ii). J
It is not hard to see that W-CMPV is NP-complete. We are set to prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 6.4. Let I = (A,C, k, `, x) be an instance of CMPV. Compute in poly-
nomial time an instance J = (W,k, `, x) of W-CMPV being equivalent to I. Next ap-
ply Lemma 6.6 to J to obtain an equivalent instance J ′ of W-CMPV of encoding length
in O((mτ)4). Finally, reduce J ′ back to an instance I ′ of CMPV in polynomial time. Hence,
the encoding length of I ′ is in (mτ)O(1), proving I ′ to be a polynomial problem kernel.
For RMPV, the proof works analogously. J
6.3 Number of agents and lifetime combined
In this section, we prove effective preprocessing regarding the parameter n+τ (and hence fixed-
parameter tractability).
I Theorem 6.7. CMPV and RMPV admit problem kernels of size polynomial in n+ τ .
Firstly, we note that there are at most n · τ approvals in any instance. Hence, we have the
following.
I Observation 5. There are at least max{0,m− n · τ} candidates which are never approved.
Upon Observation 5, we will next discuss deleting candidates which are never approved, in
order to upper-bound the number m of candidates by some polynomial function in n+ τ .
With the latter, together with Theorem 6.4 we will obtain the polynomial-size problem
kernels. We treat each of CMPV and RMPV separately.
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CMPV. Observation 5 allows us to reduce any instance of CMPV to an equivalent instance
with m ≤ n · τ .
I Proposition 6.8. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given any instance I =
(A,C,U, k, `, x) of CMPV, computes an equivalent instance I ′ = (A,C ′, U, k, `, x) with |C ′| ≤
|A| · |U |.
To obtain Proposition 6.8, we employ the following reduction rule.
I Reduction Rule 1. If m > nτ , delete a candidate which is never approved.
Intuitively, Reduction Rule 1 is correct because selecting a candidate which is never approved
into a committee at some stage is not beneficial: it only increases the symmetric difference
at the respective stage but not the committee’s score.
Proof. Let I ′ be the instance obtained from I by Reduction Rule 1 deleting z ∈ C which is
never approved (its existence follows from Observation 5). If C′ is a solution to I ′, then it is
also to I. Conversely, if there is a solution that does not contain z, then this is a solution
to I ′. So, assume that every solution contains z.
Let C = (C1, . . . , Cτ ) be a solution to I such that the first appearance of z in the sequence
is the latest. Let z ∈ Ct1 , where t1 is the smallest index with this property. Let t2 > t1 be the
largest index such that z ∈ Ct2 for all t1 ≤ t ≤ t2. We claim that deleting z from Ct for t1 ≤
t ≤ t2 constructs another solution with the first appearance of z being later, contradicting our
choice of C. It holds true that for all t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, we have |Ct \{z}| = |Ct|−1 < k and, since z
is never approved, we have that scoret(Ct \ {z}) ≥ x. Moreover, for each |Ct4Ct+1| ≤ `
for each t1 ≤ t < t2. Finally, we have that |Ct1−14(Ct1 \ {z})| < |Ct1−14Ct1 | ≤ `,
since z 6∈ Ct1−1. Similarly, |(Ct2 \ {z})4Ct2+1| < |Ct24Ct2+1| ≤ `, since z 6∈ Ct2+1. Hence,
we constructed a solution where the first appearance of z is later than for C, contradicting
the choice of C. It follows that there is a solution not containing z, witnessing that I is a
yes-instance. Thus, the correctness of the rule follows.
The claimed running time is immediate: in linear time, identify m− nτ candidates that
are never approved and delete them from the candidate set. J
We can safely apply Reduction Rule 1 exhaustively in polynomial-time, hence we get Propos-
ition 6.8.
RMPV. For RMPV, a similar approach applies. However, we need to carefully adjust `. We
first note that if k < `/2, then we are trivially facing a no-instance. Thus, in the following we
assume that k ≥ `/2. Additionally, we assume that m > nτ ; otherwise, the polynomial-time
algorithm from Proposition 6.8 simply outputs the original instance.
We start with the following reduction rule that allows us to upper-bound the number of
candidates by nτ or kτ , depending on which of n and k is larger.
I Reduction Rule 2. If m > max{n, k} · τ , then delete a candidate that is never approved.
Proof. Let I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) be an instance of RMPV with m > max{n, k} · τ , and
let I ′ = (A,C ′, U, k, `, x) be the instance of RMPV obtained from applying the reduction
rule to I, where C ′ = C \ {z} (z is a candidate that is never approved, which exists
since m > nτ). We claim that I is a yes-instance if and only if I ′ is a yes-instance.
(⇐) Immediate.
(⇒) Let I be a yes-instance. We claim that there is a solution C′ = (C ′1, . . . , C ′τ )
such that z 6∈ ⋃τt=1 C ′t. Suppose not, and let C = (C1, . . . , Cτ ) be a solution to I which
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contains z. Since |Ct| ≤ k, there is y ∈ C such that y 6∈
⋃τ
t=1 Ct, as m > kτ . We claim
that Ĉ = (Ĉ1, . . . , Ĉτ ) with
Ĉt =
{
Ct, z 6∈ Ct
(Ct \ {z}) ∪ {y}, otherwise,
is a solution to I (roughly, Ĉ is obtained from C by replacing each occurrence of z by y).
Clearly, |Ĉt| ≤ k, scoret(Ĉt) ≥ x, and even |Ĉt4Ĉt+1| ≥ `, since whenever z ∈ (Ct4Ct+1),
we now have y ∈ (Ĉt4Ĉt+1). It follows that Ĉ is a solution not containing z. Hence, C′
exists and is a solution to I ′. J
Reduction Rule 2 can be done in polynomial time; thus, in the case of k ≤ n, applying
this rule exhaustively already yields the result from Theorem 6.7. Yet, the case of k > n still
needs to be refined, which we do in the following Lemma 6.9.
I Lemma 6.9. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given an instance of RMPV with
k > n and m = kτ , computes an equivalent instance of RMPV with m = nτ .
Proof. Let I = (A,C,U, k, `, x) be an instance of RMPV with m = kτ candidates, |A| =
n agents and k > n. We give a polynomial-time reduction that transforms I into an
equivalent instance I ′ = (A,C ′, U, k′, `′, x) with |C ′| = nτ candidates, where k′ = n and
`′ = ` − 2(k − n). Precisely, denoting the number of approved candidates by α (note
that α ≤ nτ), the set C ′ ⊂ C consists of all approved candidates and nτ − α arbitrary
never-approved candidates.
(⇒) Let I be a yes-instance with solution C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cτ ). Without loss of
generality, we assume that each committee of C has at least n members. If this is not
the case, then we select an arbitrary committee with fewer than n candidates and we add
arbitrarily chosen unused candidates to reach n members. We repeat this procedure for
all committees that have fewer than n members. We can afford this because we always
have enough unused candidates. Indeed, suppose that for some iteration of the procedure,
we need y ≤ n candidates to fill up the corresponding committee C∗ ∈ C. Then, at most
k(τ − 1) candidates are used in other committees. Comparing the number of all candidates
with the upper-bound on the number of used candidates as follows
|C| − (k(τ − 1) + n− y) = kτ − (k(τ − 1) + n− y) = k − n+ y > n− n+ y
shows that we have even more than y unused candidates that the procedure can use to fill
up committee C∗. The updates carried out by the procedure clearly do not lower the scores
of the altered committees.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , τ} we order Ci’s members decreasingly with respect to the number of
approvals the members get (breaking ties arbitrarily). Then, we select top n of them forming
a set trunc(Ci). We claim that C′ = (trunc(C1), trunc(C2), . . . , trunc(Cτ )) is a solution
to I ′. Indeed, the committees of C′ are of size n and their score is at least x. The latter
follows from the fact that x ≤ n and thus n candidates is always enough to yield score
at least x. In order to show that |trunc(Ci)4trunc(Ci+1)| ≥ `′, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1},
assume for contradiction this is not the case. That is, suppose |trunc(Cj)4trunc(Cj+1)| < `′
for some j ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}. Let C¯i := Ci \ trunc(Ci), for i ∈ {j, j + 1}. Observe that
|C¯j | ≤ (k − n) and |C¯j+1| ≤ (k − n). Thus, |C¯j4C¯j+1| ≤ 2(k − n). Recognizing that
|Cj4Cj+1| = |trunc(Cj)4trunc(Cj+1)|+ |C¯j4C¯j+1| < `′ + 2(k − n) = `
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gives that |Cj4Cj+1| < `, which contradicts the fact that C is a solution to I.
(⇐) Let I ′ be a yes-instance with a solution C′ = (C ′1, C ′2, . . . , C ′τ ) and let C¯ := C \C ′.
A solution to instance I is then C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cτ ) where each of sets Ct is a copy of C ′t
with k − n unique candidates from C¯ added; formally, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, Ct = C ′t ∪ C¯t
such that |C¯t| = k − n and
⋂τ
i=1 C¯i = ∅. Since∣∣∣∣ τ⋃
t=1
C¯t
∣∣∣∣ = (k − n)τ = kτ − nτ = |C| − |C ′| = |C¯|,
such a solution C can be constructed. Naturally, it holds for all t ∈ {1, . . . , τ} that scoret(Ct) ≥
scoret(C ′t) ≥ x and that |Ct| ≤ k. Furthermore, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}, |Ct4Ct+1| ≥ `.
This is due to the fact that
|Ct4Ct+1| = |C ′t4C ′t+1|+ |C¯t4C¯t+1| = |C ′t4C ′t+1|+ 2(k − n) ≥ `′ + 2(k − n) = `. J
Lemma 6.9 concludes the case of k > n and so the proof of Theorem 6.7 for RMPV.
7 Conclusion
As opposed to the single-stage case, conservative and revolutionary committee election over
multiple stages are NP-complete problems, even for a constant number of agents. From a
parameterized algorithmic point of view, computing a revolutionary multistage committee is
easier than a conservative one: When asking for committees to change for all but constantly
many candidates, RMPV is polynomial time solvable, yet when asking for committees
to change for only constant many candidates, CMPV remains NP-hard. Facing a few (a
constant number of) stages, both CMPV and RMPV become polynomial-time solvable.
Moreover, for both CMPV and RMPV, while data reduction to size polynomial in the
number of agents and the number of candidates we proved to be unlikely, combining any
of the two parameters with the number of stages allows for efficient data reduction. This
underlines the importance of the time aspect for effective preprocessing.
We left open whether RMPV is W-hard or fixed-parameter tractable regarding the
parameters k and `. Further future work may include approximate or randomized algorithmics
for CMPV and RMPV. Moreover, further concepts/problems from computational social
choice may be studied in the (conservative and revolutionary) multistage model. Also, we
think that the revolutionary multistage model may be relevant on its own.
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